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Based on research on the increasingly popular unconscious thought effect (UTE), it has
been suggested that physicians might make better diagnostic decisions after a period of
distraction than after an equivalent amount of time of conscious deliberation. However,
published attempts to demonstrate the UTE in medical decision making have yielded
inconsistent results. In the present study, we report the results of a meta-analysis of all
the available evidence on the UTE in medical decisions made by expert and novice
clinicians. The meta-analysis failed to find a significant contribution of unconscious
thought (UT) to the accuracy of medical decisions. This result cannot be easily attributed
to any of the potential moderators of the UTE that have been discussed in the literature.
Furthermore, a Bayes factor analysis shows that most experimental conditions provide
positive support for the null hypothesis, suggesting that these null results do not reflect
a simple lack of statistical power. We suggest ways in which new studies could usefully
provide further evidence on the UTE. Unless future research shows otherwise, the
recommendation of using UT to improve medical decisions lacks empirical support.
Keywords: Bayes factors, deliberation without attention, medical decision making, meta-analysis, unconscious
thought effect
If your physician told you that instead of thinking logically and analytically about each case she
prefers to rely on intuition and unconscious thought (UT) to make her diagnostic decisions,
you would probably express some concern. Yet, she would be following the recommendations of
an increasing number of scholars who advise practitioners and patients to rely on unconscious
processes to make complex medical decisions (e.g., de Vries et al., 2010; Dhaliwal, 2010;
Trowbridge et al., 2013; Manigault et al., 2015). This suggestion is also in line with the current
enthusiasm in the media and in popular science books for intuition and unconscious mental
processes (Gladwell, 2005; Gigerenzer, 2007; Kahneman, 2011).
Much of this interest stems from research on an intriguing phenomenon known as the
UT eﬀect (UTE, sometimes referred to as the deliberation-without-attention eﬀect). In a
typical UTE experiment, participants are exposed to a complex decision involving many
variables, such as choosing between consumer products based on long lists of features
of each product. After reading this information, some participants are asked to spend
a few minutes thinking about it before making a decision, while other participants are
instructed to spend an equal amount of time performing a distracting task, such as
solving anagrams or word-search puzzles. The crucial result of these experiments is that,
under some conditions, participants seem to make better decisions after the distracting
task than after conscious deliberation. Most importantly, this advantage of UT over
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conscious thought (CT) is mainly observed for complex tasks
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). According to
the theoretical framework proposed by these researchers, this
phenomenon occurs because, unlike conscious thinking, the
unconscious is not limited by working memory constraints and,
consequently, is able to deal with larger amounts of information
(Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). This feature of UT makes it
ideal for complex decisions involving multiple cues and options.
Since the publication of the seminal UTE experiments in
Science, researchers have shown some skepticism about the
relevance of these ﬁndings for decision making in real life,
particularly in the domain of health-related decisions (Bekker,
2006). However, a subsequent study by de Vries et al. (2010)
suggested that these concerns might be unjustiﬁed. Clinical
psychology students were presented with two complex case
descriptions from the DSM-IV casebook, each comprising
2–3 paragraphs of text summarizing a patient’s case notes.
After reading the descriptions, one group of participants was
instructed to think about this information for 4 min, while
the other group was asked to spend 4 min solving a word-
ﬁnding puzzle before diagnosing. The authors found that the
diagnoses of the latter group were signiﬁcantly more accurate
(i.e., in agreement with the diagnoses provided by the DSM-
IV casebook) than the diagnoses of the former group, thereby
providing the ﬁrst demonstration of the UTE in medical decision
making.
Subsequent attempts to ﬁnd a UT advantage in medical
decisions have yielded inconsistent results, though. Mamede
et al. (2010) conducted a larger study, involving not only
medical students but also physicians, where they manipulated
the complexity of the diagnostic decision and used two diﬀerent
control conditions for assessing the UT advantage. Participants
read summaries of real cases and their diagnoses were assessed
against the conﬁrmed diagnoses of those patients. A signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in favor of a UTE was found in some conditions, but
not in those where the eﬀect was expected to be larger (i.e., in
complex problems). In other conditions, the diﬀerence was non-
signiﬁcant or even reversed. Overall, the results of the experiment
were largely inconsistent with the predictions of the UTE theory.
Bonke et al. (2014) explored the UTE in a medical prognosis
task. Both physicians andmedical students were asked to estimate
the life expectancy of four hypothetical patients. Accuracy was
assessed by measuring the rank correlation between participants
responses and the estimated life expectancy based on the number
of favorable and unfavorable symptoms of each case. Case
diﬃculty was manipulated experimentally. Half the participants
were asked to spend some minutes thinking about the cases
before making their diagnoses, while the remaining participants
were asked to solve anagrams during that time. Although the
descriptive statistics suggest that a UTE may have been present in
some conditions, the main eﬀect of thinking mode (UT vs. CT)
was not statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, in a recent study by Woolley et al. (2015), family
physicians were asked to diagnose three diﬃcult cases based
on real patients. Accuracy was measured against the patient’s
known diagnosis (strict measure), and also against each
case’s plausible diagnoses (lenient measure). Some physicians
diagnosed immediately after reading each case, others after
spending a few minutes performing a distracting n-back task,
while others were asked to deliberate for as long as they needed.
The study found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in diagnostic accuracy
between the participants who were distracted before diagnosing
and those in the two control groups, thus failing to replicate the
UTE. To the best of our knowledge, these are the only studies
that have explored the UTE in clinicians using a medical task that
required domain knowledge.
In summary, the experiments conducted so far to explore the
UTE in clinicians’ decision making have yielded contradictory
results, with the eﬀect being observed in the original report by
de Vries et al. (2010) and in some (but not all) conditions of
the Mamede et al. (2010) and Bonke et al. (2014) studies, but
not in the Woolley et al. (2015) study. Although this suggests
that the eﬀect might not be reliable, alternative explanations are
possible. First, the statistical power of these experiments might
not be large enough to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect in all cases. Second,
previous failures to replicate the UTE in other domains have been
attributed to the potential contribution of a series of moderators
(Strick et al., 2011). Perhaps the same moderators have prevented
the eﬀect from manifesting in these medical decision making
studies. A simple approach to decide between these alternative
interpretations is to conduct a meta-analysis on all the evidence
available so far. If failures to replicate were simply due to a lack of
statistical power, then a highly powered meta-analysis conducted
on the results of all the experiments should yield a clear UT
advantage. The potential role of moderators can also be assessed
by means of meta-regressions.
Ideally, the eﬀect sizes included in a meta-analysis should be
statistically independent from each other. This assumption is
violated when the original studies include several manipulations
within one experiment, when researchers report the impact of a
manipulation on several dependent measures, or when a speciﬁc
group of participants (e.g., a UT condition) is compared with
two diﬀerent control groups (e.g., a CT and an immediate
condition). A typical solution is to combine all the eﬀect sizes
from a particular study or condition into a single composite
eﬀect size (Nieuwenstein et al., 2015). However, this correction
comes at a cost, because it involves losing any information
about potential moderators that were manipulated within those
conditions or experiments. Previous meta-analyses of the UTE
have sometimes retained non-independent eﬀect sizes when
they conveyed valuable information about potential moderators
(Strick et al., 2011). In the present review, we adopted both
approaches. First, we conducted a meta-analysis including all
data points. This allowed us to explore the role of a series of
potential moderators. To make sure that the conclusions of the
ﬁrst meta-analysis were not biased by the non-independence
of eﬀect sizes, we conducted a second meta-analysis, where
composite eﬀect sizes were computed for non-independent
conditions.
A key assumption of the UTE theory is that UT yields better
decisions than CT only for complex decisions. Consistent with
this assumption, a previous meta-analysis of the UTE found that
the complexity of the task was a signiﬁcant moderator of the
eﬀect (Strick et al., 2011). Dijksterhuis et al. (2009) suggested that
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the UTE is stronger with expert participants (but see González-
Vallejo and Phillips, 2010). On the basis of this, it can be predicted
that the UTE should be stronger in physicians than in medical
students. These two factors (task diﬃculty and participants’
experience) were included as moderators in the meta-analysis.
Similarly, Strick et al. (2011) found that the size of the UTE
varies depending on the type of distracting task that participants
in the UT condition are asked to perform. Speciﬁcally, the UTE
was larger when participants were asked to conduct a word-
search task, slightly smaller when they were asked to conduct an
n-back task and smallest when they had to complete anagrams.
In our ﬁrst meta-analysis, this potential moderator was coded as
a three-level variable.
We also included as potential moderators two features that
have been manipulated in UTE experiments with medical
decision tasks or that have varied substantially from one
experiment to another. First, Mamede et al. (2010) and Woolley
et al. (2015) used two diﬀerent controls to assess the UTE:
a CT condition, where participants responded after conscious
deliberation, and an immediate condition, where participants
responded immediately after the materials were presented. Some
authors have argued that the UTE might actually be the product
of poor performance in the CT conditions and that an immediate
condition is a better control for UTE experiments (Shanks,
2006; Waroquier et al., 2010). Secondly, although all other
experiments used a between-participants design, Mamede et al.
(2010) manipulated thinking modality within participants. As
these study features (type of control condition and study design)
might play a role in the ﬁnal eﬀect size, we included them as
moderators in the ﬁrst meta-analysis.
The eﬀect size of de Vries et al. (2010) was computed from the
F-value reported in the main text. In the case of Mamede et al.
(2010), the ﬁrst author provided us with the descriptive statistics
necessary to compute dav scores1. Eﬀect sizes for Bonke et al.
(2014) were computed from the descriptive statistics provided in
their Table 4. In the case of Woolley et al. (2015), we had access
to the raw data, which allowed us to compute diﬀerent eﬀect
sizes for each control condition (CT and immediate) and for two
levels of diﬃculty (Cases 1 and 2 were coded as complex and
Case 3 as simple, based on participants’ mean accuracy rates of
18, 21, and 42%, respectively). These eﬀect sizes were submitted
to random-eﬀects and mixed-eﬀects meta-analyses using the
metafor R package (Viechtbauer, 2010).
The results of the ﬁrst meta-analysis are shown in Figure 1.
As can be seen in the bottom row, the conﬁdence interval of
the random-eﬀects model includes zero. Therefore the average
1Instead of using the standard deviation of the diﬀerences between conditions, as in
a normal t-test for paired measures and the Cohen’s dz computed from it, Cohen’s
dav scores are based on the average mean standard deviation across conditions (see
Lakens, 2013).
FIGURE 1 | Forest plot of the first meta-analysis. Five moderators were
included: Expertise, i.e., whether participants were novices (0) or experts (1);
Complexity, i.e., whether the case materials were simple (0) or complex (1);
Control, i.e., whether the UT condition was compared to a conscious-thought
(0) or an immediate condition (1); Design, i.e., whether the study design was
between- (0) or within-participants (1); and Distractor, i.e., whether the
distraction task in the UT condition was anagrams (1), an n-back task (2), or a
word-search puzzle (3).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 636
Vadillo et al. Unconscious thought in medical decision making
eﬀect size of these studies cannot be considered statistically
signiﬁcant, z = 0.35, p = 0.73. Analysis of heterogeneity showed
that there were systematic diﬀerences across studies, I2 = 69.90%,
Q(16) = 51.83, p < 0.0001, possibly arising from the diversity
of procedures, samples, and analysis strategies. The problem of
heterogeneity is somewhat ameliorated by the use of a random-
eﬀects meta-analysis, which does not assume that all the studies
are exploring exactly the same eﬀect and which has a diﬀerent
interpretation from a ﬁxed-eﬀects meta-analysis (Riley et al.,
2011).
To explore whether any of the ﬁve moderators could explain
a proportion of the heterogeneity, we analyzed their impact by
ﬁtting an independent mixed-eﬀects model for each one. Only
expertise was a signiﬁcant moderator, Q(1) = 5.71, p = 0.0169,
but in the opposite direction to that suggested by Dijksterhuis
et al. (2009): UT seemed to impair experts’ performance,
d = −0.14, 95% CI [−0.32, 0.04], Q(9) = 15.77, p = 0.0718,
and improve novices’ performance, d = 0.24, 95% CI [−0.02,
0.51], Q(6) = 20.23, p = 0.0025. The type of distractor task
also approached signiﬁcance, Q(1) = 3.83, p = 0.0503, but
further inspection of the data shows that this eﬀect is entirely
driven by a single study that used a word-search puzzle. If the
de Vries et al. (2010) study is removed from the sample, the
moderating eﬀect of the distractor task drops to negligible levels,
Q(1) = 0.2278, p = 0.63. None of the other potential moderators
reached statistical signiﬁcance.
A critical advocate of the UT theory might suggest that
the null result of the meta-analysis is due to publication bias:
skeptical researchers might be more willing to publish the results
of studies showing that UT does not improve medical decision
making, and less willing to publish successful ones. If that
were the case, then the results of the meta-analysis would be
biased in favor of the null hypothesis and would not provide
an accurate estimate of the true average eﬀect size. Funnel
plots provide a simple means to explore potential publication
biases. If the eﬀect sizes of the studies included in the meta-
analysis are plotted against their standard errors, then the data
points should appear scattered in a triangle-shaped distribution,
where the most precise experiments would yield very similar
estimations, while more variability would be observed in the
less precise studies. If there is a publication bias, the regions
of the funnel plot that correspond to non-published studies
will be empty and, consequently, the funnel plot will not be
symmetric.
Figure 2 depicts the funnel plot of the eﬀect sizes included
in our ﬁrst meta-analysis. As can be seen, all the data points
seem to be distributed symmetrically around the vertical axis. Not
surprisingly, a regression test for funnel plot asymmetry failed to
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect, t(15) = 0.10, p = 0.92. Similarly, a trim-
and-ﬁll analysis (Duval and Tweedie, 2000) did not ﬁnd studies
missing on either side of the funnel plot. There is therefore no
evidence of either positive or negative publication bias in the
meta-analysis.
The forest plot in Figure 1 shows that the UT eﬀect was
not signiﬁcant in most conditions included in the meta-analysis.
However, an important limitation of null-hypothesis signiﬁcance
testing (NHST) is that non-signiﬁcant results are ambiguous:
they can indicate either that the null hypothesis is true or that
the data are not sensitive enough to provide clear support for
the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the non-signiﬁcant results
depicted in Figure 1 cannot be taken as strong evidence that
the UTE was absent in those experiments. Unlike NHST, Bayes
FIGURE 2 | Funnel plot of the first-meta-analysis. Each data point represents the effect size and the standard error of one experimental condition. The white
area represents a pseudo confidence-interval region around the effect-size estimate with bounds equal to ±1.96 standard error.
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factors (BF01) allow researchers to draw conclusions about null
results (Rouder et al., 2009). To obtain a clearer insight into
the null results of the studies included in the meta-analysis, we
computed the BF01’s for each contrast using the BayesFactor R
package. The BF01 quantiﬁes the extent to which each result is
more consistent with the null hypothesis than with a generic
alternative hypothesis; in this case, a Cauchy distribution with
the scaling factor set to 1. This is a rather conservative prior
that allows the alternative hypothesis to gather support from very
small and even negative eﬀect sizes. A BF01 of 3 indicates that
the data are three times more likely given the null hypothesis
than the alternative hypothesis. Similarly, values below 1 indicate
that the results are more likely given the alternative than the null
hypothesis. Typically, values above 3 are considered substantial
evidence for the null hypothesis and values below 0.33 are
considered substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis.
BF01’s could not be computed for three conditions in Mamede
et al. (2010) because exact t-values were not reported. As can
be seen in Figure 1, most of the conditions included in the
meta-analyses yielded BF01’s well above 1. Only three conditions
yielded substantial evidence for the UTE, while one condition
from Mamede et al. (2010) yielded substantial support for a CT
advantage.
As mentioned earlier, an important shortcoming of this meta-
analysis is that many of the conditions included in Figure 1 are
not independent of each other. To check that the overall results
are not biased by the non-independence of data, we conducted
a second meta-analysis including only independent eﬀect sizes.
A composite eﬀect size was computed for all the related
conditions in the Mamede et al. (2010) and Bonke et al. (2014)
studies. Similarly, we computed a new eﬀect size forWoolley et al.
(2015) collapsing data across the three cases (i.e., the diﬃculty
factor) and the two control conditions (CT and immediate). The
results of the secondmeta-analysis are depicted in Supplementary
Figure S1. Although the eﬀect size estimate is somewhat less
precise, d = 0.14, 95% CI [−0.16, 0.43], the main conclusions
remain the same as in the ﬁrst meta-analysis: the average eﬀect
of the random-eﬀects model was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, z= 0.92, p= 0.36, and the heterogeneity of results remained
large and signiﬁcant, I2 = 71.16%, Q(5) = 16.36, p= 0.0059.
Overall, the results of our analyses suggest that the advantage
of UT over conscious deliberation in medical decision making is
an unreliable eﬀect and that the failure of many experiments to
replicate it reﬂects a genuine null result. It is unlikely that these
negative results are due to insuﬃcient power or to the presence
of potential moderators. The only moderator that explained
a proportion of the variance was expertise but in a direction
opposite to that found by Dijksterhuis et al. (2009). Although
a former meta-analysis of the wider literature found evidence
in favor of the UTE (Strick et al., 2011), it is interesting to
note that two other systematic reviews addressing this eﬀect
have yielded negative results (Acker, 2008; Nieuwenstein et al.,
2015). The comprehensive meta-analysis recently conducted by
Nieuwenstein et al. (2015) concentrated onmulti-attribute choice
and found no evidence for a UTE. Our results conﬁrm that this
also holds for the domain of professional medical decisions.
We should also note the failure of deliberation, as
operationalized in the included studies, to produce consistently
better medical decisions than the other two thinking modes
(Bargh, 2011). Woolley et al. (2015) hypothesized that physicians’
decisions are mostly based on fast and eﬃcient processes and
online inferences that take place while information is being
encoded (see also Flores et al., 2014). In fact, the median
thinking time in their CT condition was only 7 s, suggesting
that participants felt little need for further deliberation after
reading the materials. If most of the decision making process
takes place online, it is hardly surprising that neither a period
of distraction nor the availability of time for further deliberation
have a noticeable eﬀect on performance.
For the time being, nothing suggests that clinicians should
rely on UT to improve their decisions. Nevertheless, given the
relatively small number of available studies on this important
issue, further research should be encouraged. One obvious need
is for careful replications of the experimental conditions that
reported reliable advantages of UT over CT. A further need is
for high-powered studies that explore a wider range of materials
in combination with diﬀerent distractor tasks. Finally, diﬀerent
types of deliberation conditions could be pitted against UT, e.g.,
self-paced (as in Woolley et al., 2015), ﬁxed (as in Bonke et al.,
2014), and proceduralized (as in Mamede et al., 2010). Before
clinicians are formally advised to engage in UT to improve their
decisions, the UTE should be explored extensively in conditions
more similar to real clinical practice (see Woolley et al., 2015).
Based on the little evidence available, such a recommendation
would be premature at best.
Supplementary Material
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